Part 5: June 15, 1130

 

 

LtGen Alten (3rd Division) to Duke of Wellington:

Sir, I have just received word that a strong force of cavalry and infantry has engaged the Hanoverian units at Mons. They are falling back through town as ordered and will deploy on the northern side to slow down the enemy.

Meanwhile I have ordered my division to take up a blocking position south of Soignies: it is a strong position, with plenty of woods and buildings to support any defensive action.

At the moment I can count on the mentioned cavalry, 1^st Division and my own forces.

Wishing to know if you have any further orders!

Your humble servant

LtGen Alten

The two British units around Soignies, the 1^st and 3^rd Division could rely on very strong units – the 1^st entirely consisted of Guard units. Would 2 divisions and some cavalry be enough to significantly delay the French onslaught coming up from Mons, however?

Orders were soon dispatched to have the 2^nd Netherlands Division move up from their position in the South-East – poor quality troops – but if supported, they would certainly do better than on their own. Their available guns would also further strengthen the intended line.

LtGen Alten had a certain position in mind, where he had ordered his troops to deploy – ground he had inspected about 2 months ago: on his right flank he would be able to rely on a chateau and a few buildings as a strong defensive position, while his right was protected by a stream surrounded in heavy undergrowth and woods. The only weaker position would be the center, near the Chaussée – the place he intended to form up the Guard.

Charleroi:

The IR 28 had been ordered to concentrate near the western bridge over the river Sambre. Supported by a strong force of skirmishers they would stand and hold to the last at their designated position. It was the rear-guard that GM Pirch II had ordered to stay behind to cover the retreat of the rest of 2^nd Infantry Brigade. He had also ordered to position a number of lose formations in the town itself, to slow down the French on the main bridge likewise.

He knew that there was cavalry coming up in the west, but this made little difference. The guns would take time to move past Charleroi and get to safety – time which only a strong rear-guard action would provide. Thus Major Quadt II, in command of IR 28, was ordered to hold and delay the enemy for as long as possible. He was given no illusions as to his task, but realized the importance of actually fulfilling his duty and thus departed to see to the deployment of his men.

The glory of fighting and maybe standing against part of Napoleon's guard did not go unnoticed either!

Once the fighting had begun, the few skirmishers near the bridge were soon driven back, but the initial French onslaught lost its impetus once they reached the formed battalions of IR 28. Especially the Fusilier-Battalion distinguished themselves in the initial part of the action, driving back two pushes of what appeared to be a Tirailleurs battalion of the Young Guard.

Chatelet:

The fight for this particular crossing did not go any different than at Charleroi. The French never stopped to deploy in line or even bothered to deploy skirmishers to fight their Prussian counterparts. They simply leveled their muskets, fixed bayonets and charged. With great success as well, driving back the stunned skirmishers and almost throwing them out of southern part of the village.

Meanwhile the remaining forces of the 1^st Army Corps desperately scrambled and tried to get onto the road. It was chaotic, unorganized and most of all uncoordinated. Brigades got intermingled and lost connection to part of their formations. GenLt. Zieten was only able to give them a general rally point: the village of Gosselies – on the road north towards Quatre-Bras.